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LEGISLATION
A Survey of Financial Responsibility Laws and
Compensation of Traffic Victims: A
Proposal for Reform
I. INTRODUClMON
One of the most acute socio-economic and legal problems confront-
ing society today concerns the compensation of traffic victims. In
1966, there were 52,500 persons killed as a result of traffic accidents,'
which constituted nearly one-half of all accident fatalities. In addition
3,868,000 persons were injured,2 and the total cost of motor vehicle
accidents was estimated at ten billion dollars.3 As a result of the
steadily rising accident toll, there has been increased concern over
means of insuring that victims of automobile accidents will be com-
pensated. This concern has been aggravated by the continued pres-
ence of the financially irresponsible motorist. The problem becomes
even more acute when one considers that in 1966 there was a total of
94,177,000 motor vehicles registered in the United States4 and
98,496,000 licensed drivers,5 whereas by 1983 it is estimated that there
will be 115,000,000 vehicles.
6
The states first attempted to solve this problem by means of the
financial responsibility law. At present, all 50 states and the District
of Columbia have some form of financial responsibility statute,7 in-
cluding North Carolina, New York and Massachusetts," which also
have compulsory insurance laws. Although vigorously defended by
the insurance industry, these financial responsibility statutes have
come under strong criticism for failure to achieve their intended
purpose. Although a variety of plans for compensation without re-
spect to fault have been proposed-such as, the Columbia Plan,
Saskatchewan Plan, Full Aid Insurance, and Basic Protection Insur-
1. 1967 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT oF THE UNITED STATES 573.
2. Id. at 574. It is estimated that of this figure, 1,900,000 were disabled, of which
160,000 resulted in permanent impairments; National Safety Council, Accident Facts
4 (1967 ed.).
3. National Safety Council, supra note 2, at 3-6.
4. 1967 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 564.
5. Id.
6. KEETON & O'CoNNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTmI 12 (1965).
7. For a complete list of citations see Appendix B.
8. However, it should be noted that Massachusett's statute only applies to non-
resident motorists; MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 90, § 3G (1952).
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ance-American jurisdictions have retained the "fault" principle and
have concentrated on plans designed to assure that motorists will be
capable of responding with damages should the need arise. Thus, the
purpose of this paper is to summarize the operation and effect of
financial responsibility laws with a consideration of existing problem
areas, and to submit suggested proposals for reform.
II. OPERATON OF FINANcIAL RESPONSmLTrY LAWS
In an effort to avoid widespread enactment of compulsory insurance
laws, the insurance industry vigorously promoted financial responsi-
bility statutes.'0 The early laws were supposedly designed not only
to assure compensation to victims but also to aid in accident preven-
tion and thus many are still entitled "Safety Responsibility Law.""
The avowed purposes of such laws can be classified into three basic
objectives:' 2 (1) eliminate or segregate the bad driver, thereby pre-
venting or decreasing accidents; (2) increase the proportion of insured
vehicles or drivers and compel the bad driver to insure; and, (3)
procure the payment of more claims arising from automobile acci-
dents. The relative success or failure in attaining these three objec-
tives will be considered later in this note.
A. Historical Development
The first "Safety Responsibility Law" was enacted in Connecticut
in 1925,'3 and some eighteen were in existence by the time the
Columbia Report was issued in 1932.14 These early laws were "proof-
type" statutes whereby a driver who failed to satisfy a judgment
arising out of an accident or was convicted of a serious driving
violation was required to file proof of his ability to pay judgments
arising from "future" accidents, or else suffer revocation of his license
and/or suspension of his vehicle registration. The underlying assump-
tion of these laws was that they would promote safety by isolating bad
drivers after the first accident and making other drivers more careful
due to the threat of requiring insurance in the event of an accident.
The inadequacies of these early laws became readily apparent. As
safety measures they were a dismal failure since accident statistics
9. See KrETON & O'CoNssELL, supra note 6, at 124-90 for a discussion of the major
compensation plan proposals. These authors also present their proposal for "Basic
Protection Insurance."
10. See Aberg, Effects of and Problems Arising from Financial Responsibility Laws,
1943 INs. L.J. 72. See also Grad, Recent Developments in Automobile Accident Com-
pensation, 50 COLUM. L. Rlv. 300, 305 (1950).
11. Grad, supra note 10, at 305 n.17.
12. Aberg, supra note 10.
13. CoNN. PUB. AcT ch. 183 (1925).
14. Grad, supra note 10, at 307.
1968 ] LEGISLATION 1051
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
continued to rise and a bad driver could continue to drive by merely
furnishing proof.15 Also, administrative weaknesses often hampered
enforcement. The effectiveness of the laws depended on accurate
accident reporting which was left to the initiative of the injured
party. Often the law could only be invoked upon a showing of an
unsatisfied judgment, and if a tortfeasor was uninsured, judgment
proof, or otherwise insolvent there was little or no incentive to secure
a judgment, let alone make a report. Thus, the very fact that a driver
was financially irresponsible often protected him from the operation
of the law designed to exclude him from the highway. 6 In addition,
settlement, no matter how slight, would preclude invoking the law, and
an injured party would often leap at the opportunity of salvaging at
least a portion of his loss from a negligent driver who was financially
suspect. By far, the most obvious inadequacy of the proof-type laws
was the fact that the victim of any motorist's first accident was often
without any remedy, and as a result, these statutes were nicknamed
"first-bite" laws. It was certainly of little solace to the injured victim
to know that the negligent driver who was responsible would have to
insure for the protection of future victims.
As a result of the inadequacy of the proof-type laws, which often
left the first victim uncompensated, New Hampshire pioneered a
revised law in 1937. This law was a "security-type" statute, whereby
any person involved in a motor vehicle accident resulting in personal
injuries or property damage in excess of a minimum amount was
required to file "security" in the form of proof of ability to pay
damages, up to a statutory limit, arising out of the past accident which
caused the law to be invoked. Thus, this type of statute was an
obvious improvement, since it placed more emphasis upon compen-
sation of the initial victim and encouraged the purchase of liability
insurance prior to the first accident. Every state now requires "secur-
ity" except Massachusetts,'17 although it is somewhat ironic to note
that in enacting the new security-type statute, many states repealed
the requirement of "proof," and at present, only 21 states require
both "proof" and "security" in the event of an accident.18
B. Operation of Present Statutes
Since the majority of states based their statute on the provisions of
15. See Grad, supra note 10, at 306 discussing the criticisms put forth by the
Columbia Report.
16. Johnson, The Modern Trend in Financial Responsibility Legislation, 1944 ABA
INs. SEc-noN 67, 69.
17. In an action against a non-resident, a plaintiff can move for security; see note
8 supra.
18. KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 6, Appendix B.
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the Uniform Motor-Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, 9 the basic
operation of the laws is quite similar. Financial responsibility laws
do not take effect until a driver is either involved in an accident
resulting in personal injury or property damage above a statutory
minimum or is convicted of a serious driving violation. Thus, unlike
compulsory insurance laws, these statutes operate after the fact.
20
In the event of an accident involving personal injury or property
damage in excess of a statutory minimum,21 the operators of the
vehicles involved are required to report the accident in writing to a
designated official within a short period after the accident (normally
ten days). Failure to report can result in suspension of the operator's
license and vehicle registration. 22 Thereafter, the official will deter-
mine the amount of security required to be posted, up to the statutory
maximum.23  Thereafter, within a certain period after the report
(normally 60 days) the official will revoke the license and registrations
of each operator, and in most states each owner, unless the operators
and owners deposit security in a sum sufficient to satisfy potential
judgment.24 These security requirements are imposed regardless of
fault, although a minority of states require a preliminary finding of
probable fault before the security requirement is imposed.1 The
security requirement can be satisfied by cash, securities or bond;
however, the majority of motorists satisfy the requirement by proof
of the existence of an automobile liability policy. As to proof of
future financial responsibility, most jurisdictions do not require it on
the basis of mere involvement in an accident; 26 but, if a motorist has
a judgment recovered against him or is convicted of a serious traffic
violation, he must then not only satisfy the past judgment (pre-
sumably out of the security deposit) but must give proof of future
financial responsibility for a period ranging from one year to in-
definitely.2 7
19. UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE ch. 7 (1962 version) (Nat'l Comm'n on Uniform
Traffic Laws and Ordinances). The Tennessee statute is typical of the majority of
states; thus, reference will be made to its law as an example of pertinent provisions.
20. However, Connecticut and Rhode Island require minors owning vehicles to
furnish proof prior to registration. Maryland requires proof prior to granting a minor
a license.
21. The sum varies from no minimum in Oregon to $250 in Nevada. 35 states
require $100.
22. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1203 (Supp. 1967).
23. The statutory maximum normally amounts to $10,000 for each person, $20,000
for each accident and $5,000 for property damage. See, e.g., id. § 59-1206(a) (Supp.
1967).
24. See e.g., id. § 59-1204 (Supp. 1967).
25. E.g., Vermont. 42 states impose the requirement regardless of fault.
26. 22 states do have such a requirement.
27. The normal period is three years. Maryland's law does not specify the period
for which proof is required.
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The statutes exempt certain vehicles and accidents, such as self
insurers, certain publicly or government owned vehicles, and the
owner or operator of a legally parked automobile.2 These statutes-
also apply to non-residents and accidents in other states through
reciprocity provisions.2
Most statutes provide that the license and registrations of a judg-
ment debtor shall be suspended unless the judgment is paid (up to
the statutory maximum) within a certain period (usually 60 days)
after the date of final judgment.30 However, most states allow for
installment payment of judgments or other agreement satisfactory to
the parties and approved by the official.
In nearly every state, the security requirement is terminated by
exoneration or settlement, or by a lapse of a certain period (normally
one year) with no suit having been brought.3' Also, some states allow
the official or the court to restore limited license or registration privi-
leges where necessary for occupation or livelihood.32
III. LEGAL PROBLEMS ARISING OUT OF FINANCIAL
RiESPON5SBILTY LAws
A. Constitutionality
Financial responsibility laws have been subjected to a wide variety
of constitutional attacks33 and, with few exceptions,34 have been up-
held. The overwhelming majority of the courts have viewed these
statutes as a reasonable exercise of police power and thus have held
that such laws do not violate the equal protection,35 or due process
clauses, 36 the right against self-incrimination, 7 or the prohibition of
imprisonment for civil debt,38 nor are such laws an improper delega-
28. E.g., Tennessee exempts all three.
29. 42 states provide for reciprocity. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1208 (Supp.
1967).
30. See, e.g., id. § 59-1219 (Supp. 1967).
31. See, e.g., id. § 59-1212 (Supp. 1967).
32. E.g., Delaware and Michigan.
33. For an exhaustive summary of the cases and constitutional questions raised, see
Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 1011 (1954).
34. E.g., State v. Kouni, 58 Idaho 493, 76 P.2d 917 (1938) (no provision for
notice, hearing or review).
35. E.g., Escobedo v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 222 P.2d 1
(1950).
36. E.g., id.; Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941).
37. Surtman v. Secretary of State, 309 Mich. 270, 15 N.W.2d 471, cert. denied 323
U.S. 806 (1944).
38. Sullins v. Butler, 175 Tenn. 468, 135 S.W.2d 930 (1940).
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tion of judicial power,3 or special legislation.4 0
1. Due Process.-The majority of cases involving the constitutional-
ity of these laws have attacked the provision providing for revocation
or suspension of a license without prior hearing as a violation of
procedural due process. In a long line of decisions, courts throughout
the country have upheld this provision on the grounds that judicial
review was available, and that a license to drive and use of the
highways was a privilege41 rather than a right and the right to revoke
the privilege was a condition precedent to granting it.
Just as it appeared as though the due process question had been
settled, the Colorado Supreme Court decided People v. Nothaus43 in
1961, holding that the provision which allowed summary suspension
of licenses and registrations, without prior hearing, for failure to
deposit security was unconstitutional as a violation of due process.
The majority reasoned that such a provision exceeded permissible
police power, since the statute does not protect the public but is used
only to coerce payment and also, that the right to use the highways
was an inalienable one. The court appeared to rest its decision upon
a concept of vested rights although ironically it stated that a com-
pulsory insurance law as a condition precedent to issuance of a
license would be valid. This decision generated considerable com-
ment, 4 with at least two writers strongly supporting the decision.45
Nevertheless, in the only subsequent decision' concerning this issue,
the Arizona Supreme Court adhered to the majority view, and thus it
would appear that the weight of authority together with the ringing
endorsement of such laws by the United States Supreme Court" has
effectively isolated the Nothaus decision. Despite this fact, it should
be noted that nearly all statutes now provide for a hearing upon
request. 8
39. E.g., Escobedo v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 222 P.2d 1
(1950).
40. Watson v. State Division of Motor Vehicles, 212 Cal. 279, 298 P. 481 (1931).
41. See cases cited in Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 279, 380 P.2d 136,
139-40 (1963).
42. Escobedo v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950);
Berberian v. Lussier, 87 R.I. 226, 139 A.2d 869 (1958); wherein both courts upheld
such a provision even though holding that the license to drive was a right.
43. 363 P.2d 180 (Colo. 1961).
44. There were some ten case comments including 48 IowA L. Rnv. 140 (1962);
30 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 523 (1962).
45. Kelleghan, The Illinois Financial Responsibility Law: is it Constitutional?, 51
ILL. B.J. 116 (1962); see also 30 GEo. WAsr. L. REv. 523, 529 (1962).
46. Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380 P.2d 136 (1963).
47. Kesler v. Dept. of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962) (dictum).
48. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1202 (Supp. 1967) (request must be made within




2. Bankruptcy.-Every state has a provision to the effect that a
discharge in bankruptcy following a final judgment shall not relieve
the judgment debtor from any requirements of the financial responsi-
bility law.49 Although the United States Supreme Court upheld the
validity of this provision in Reitz v. Mealey,50 the constitutionality was
recently attacked in Kesler v. Department of Public Safety,51 by a
trustee in bankruptcy on the ground that such a provision conflicted
with section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act 2 and was therefore void under
the supremacy clause 53 of the United States Constitution. The major-
ity upheld the provision even though it conflicted with the Bank-
ruptcy Act. The majority reasoned that financial responsibility laws
were vital to the police power of the state as a deterent to unsafe
drivingM and such interest was unrelated to the policy behind the
Bankruptcy Act. Thus, there was no "clear collision with a national
law which has the right of way under the supremacy clause." 55 It
would appear that constitutional questions concerning financial re-
sponsibility laws have by and large been settled.
B. Insurers' Liability Under the Insurance Contract in, Relation
to the Requirements of the Financial Responsibility Laws
The greatest source of litigation with respect to financial responsi-
bility laws has concerned the liabilities of insurers under the terms
of the insurance contract where such terms conflict with the policies
sought to be achieved by the laws. In form, the automobile liability
policy is an indemnity contract for protection of the insured, or a
two-party contract. In practice, it also fulfills the function of com-
pensating the victims of the insured's negligence, and this compen-
satory element is recognized in many states through a statutory right
of allowing an injured party to sue on a policy where his judgment
against the insured is unsatisfied. Since the rights of the injured
party in such a case are dependent upon the validity of the insurance
policy, such a suit is generally precluded where the insured has
49. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1236 (Supp. 1967). 49 states and the District
of Columbia have a statutory provision; Florida has construed the same result in
absence of statute; see 1959 Fla. Op. Atty. Gen. 059-20.
50. 314 U.S. 33 (1941).
51. 369 U.S. 153 (1962). The majority opinion contains an excellent discussion of
the development of these laws.
52. 11 U.S.C. § 35(a), "A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from
all of his provable debts.
53. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
54. The majority referred to Reitz v. Mealey for the proposition that the policy of
the laws would be frustrated if negligent drivers could avoid its effect "by the simple
expedient of voluntary bankruptcy." 369 U.S. 153, 169 (1962).
55. 369 U.S. 153, 172 (1962). Chief Justice Warren and Justice Black dissented.
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breached the terms of the policy. Thus, in absence of statute, the
injured party cannot recover where the insured procured the policy
by fraud or misrepresentation, breached a warranty, violated a policy
provision, delayed in reporting an accident, failed to cooperate with
the insurer in defending a suit, or breached in any one of a number
of other ways.56 Despite the existence of such defenses, the advent
of financial responsibility laws, with their strong policy of protecting
the public against loss or injury due to financially irresponsible motor-
ists, has caused the courts and the legislatures to stress the com-
pensatory feature of liability insurance, and as a result, they have
to some extent sought to give the injured party rights under the
insurance contract, independent of the insured's rights, derived from
the statute and public policy.5 7 As a result these laws have greatly
affected many of the traditional contractual defenses. However, there
is an important distinction between certification of a policy as "proof"
of financial responsibility and "notice" by the insurer of a policy in
effect at the time of an accident.
1. Certification as "Proof."-The method most commonly used for
furnishing evidence of financial responsibility in the future is the
filing of a certificate (usually referred to as an "SR-22") by an
insurer certifying that it has in force a motor vehicle liability insurance
policy in specified amounts and in accordance with the requirements
of the law. By filing such a certificate, many of the exclusions and
conditions of the policy are no longer available to the insurer in a
suit by the injured party.
Over two-thirds of the states have provisions which define the
requirements of a certified "motor vehicle liability policy" 8 as being
"proof," and further, provide that such policy cannot be cancelled or
terminated unless notice (normally ten days) is filed with the des-
ignated official.5 9 The most important clause in these provisions is
that upon an injury or damage covered by the policy, the liability of
the insurer becomes 'absolute" and cannot thereafter be cancelled;
nor will any statement by the insured or violation of the policy defeat
or void the policy.60 However, the weight of authority is that such
a provision only applies to policies "required" as proof under the
56. See Note, Insurance Law-Financial Responsibility Laws-Insurer's Absolute
Liability After Accident, 27 N.Y.U. L. REv. 817 (1952) and cases cited therein. The
author also cites Bickford, Actions Against Insurers Under Condition 7 of the Standard
Automobile Liability Policy, 1940-1941 ABA INS. SEcTIoN 45.
57. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Wolbarst, 95 N.H. 40, 57 A.2d 151 (1948).
58. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1223 (Supp. 1967). See also, UNIoRM VEHICLE
CODE, § 7-324 (1962) (Nat'l Comm'n on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances).
59. TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1224 (Supp. 1967).
60. E.g., id. § 59-1223(1).
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statute, and does not apply to an automobile liability policy volun-
tarily obtained in order to comply with the security requirement
should the need arise.'
The term "absolute liability" does not mean absolute in a literal
sense. Thus, there is no liability where the accident occurred after
the policy expired,62 or where the insured concealed the fact that the
accident sued on occurred prior to the application,6 3 or where a policy
excludes an employee covered by workmen's compensation. 4 The
courts have also held that the common law remedies of rescission and
cancellation ab initio on the grounds of fraud or concealment in
procuring the policy have been displaced by the statutory cancellation
procedures provided.6
As previously stated, certification bars many defenses normally
available to the insurer. Thus it has been held that failure to notify
the insurer of an accident,66 breach of warranty of sole ownership,"
failure to notify insurer of a newly acquired automobile within 30
days,68 lack of cooperation of insured,69 operating an automobile
owned by the insured but not declared in the policy,70 and a reserva-
tion of rights agreement entered into prior to certification7' are not
valid defenses. The fact that the insured was involved in an illegal
act at the time of the accident has also been denied as a defense to
the insurer.72 Perhaps the most extreme holding has been denial of
the defense that the injury occurred as a result of the insured's
intentional tort.7 3 The question of collusion between the insured and
61. E.g., Hoosier Cas. Co. v. Fox, 102 F. Supp. 214, 232 (N.D. Iowa 1952) (words
"Motor vehicle liability policy" held to be a term of art referring only to policies
certified as proof). See also 6 U. KAN. L. REv. 358, 367 n.67 and cases cited therein
(1958).
62. Wilkins v. Inland Mut. Ins. Co., 253 F.2d 489 (4th. Cir. 1958).
63. Continental Cas. Co. v. Lanzisero, 119 N.J.Eq. 166, 181 A. 170 (1935). But see
Royal Indem. Co. v. Granite Trucking Co., 296 Mass. 149, 4 N.E.2d 809 (1936).
64. Ambrose v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 124 N.J.L. 438, 12 A.2d 693 (1940).
65. Teeter v. Allstate Ins. Co., 9 App. Div. 2d 176, 192 N.Y.S.2d 610 (1959);
Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co. v. Bingham, 10 N.J. 460, 92 A.2d 1 (1952).
66. Royal Indem. Co. v. Olnstead, 193 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1951).
67. Century Indem. Co. v. Simon, 77 F. Supp. 221 (D. N.J. 1948).
68. Merchants Mut. Cas. Co. v. Egan, 91 N.H. 368, 20 A.2d 480 (1941)
(failure to notify insurer of insured's legal representative within 30 days of insured's
death).
69. Continental Ins. Co. v. Charest, 91 N.H. 378, 20 A.2d 477 (1941).
70. Montgomery v. Keystone Mut. Cas. Co., 357 Pa. 223, 53 A.2d 539 (1947).
But see Levinson v. Travelers Indem. Co., 129 S.E.2d 297 (N.C. 1963).
71. La Point v. Richards, 66 Wash. 2d 585, 403 P.2d 889 (1965).
72. Sperling v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 7 N.Y.2d 442, 166 N.E.2d 482 (1960); Sky
v. Keystone Mut. Cas. Co., 150 Pa. Super. 613, 29 A.2d 230 (1942). In both cases
the insured was driving a stolen vehicle. For a discussion of these cases and note 73
infra, see (Comment, Insurance-Financial--Responsibility Laws-Operation to Deprive
Insurers of Certain Defenses, 40 ORE. L. BREv. 351, 356-58 (1961).
73. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co. v. Wolbarst, 95 N.H. 40, 57 A.2d 151 (1948).
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injured party as a valid defense has not arisen thus far; but since there
would seem to be no valid reason to extend liability to a fraudulent
third party claimant, such defense would probably be valid.
2. "Notice" of Policy in Existence as "Security."-As previously
stated, there is an important distinction between certification of a
policy as proof for future liability, and notice by an insurer of a
policy in effect at the time of an accident in order to satisfy the
requirement of security. Where a policy has not been certified as
proof of financial responsibility for the future, but voluntarily procured
by the insured to meet the security requirement should the need arise,
the majority of courts have held that the liability of the insurer is not
absolute, and it may take advantage of policy defenses and exclu-
sions.7 The courts have distinguished between a "motor-vehicle
liability policy" required by law as proof, and an "automobile liability
policy" which has not been certified as proof.7
One problem which has arisen concerns the effect of the "conform-
ity clause." Most policies contain a provision stating that the policy
will conform to the financial responsibility laws of any state, and as
a result, some courts have held that this caused the liability of the
insurer to become absolute regardless of whether the policy was
certified as proof.7 6 The confusion has been largely the result of a
group of decisions from New Jersey"7 and New Hampshire.78 How-
ever, with respect to these two states, the holdings were based upon
special statutory provisions.7 9 It appeared that the confusion with
respect to conformity clauses had been rendered moot with the 1955
The insured intentionally bumped another automobile causing it to go out of control
and crash. The court reasoned that the injuries were within the statutory langauge
"accidentally sustained." See also Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 261 N.C. 285,
134 S.E.2d 654 (1964) (holding that intentionally inflicted injuries were within the
coverage of the policy).
74. See Risjord & Austin, The Financial Responsibility Condition of the Automobile
Liability Policy, 25 U. KAN. Crry L. REv. 83, 85-90 (1956). See also 10 OKLA. L. REV.
195, 196 n.1 and cases cited therein (1957).
75. See, e.g., Hoosier Cas. Co. v. Fox, 102 F. Supp. 214, 232 (N.D. Iowa 1952)
See also Comment, The New Kansas Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, 6 U. KAN.
L. REv. 358, 367 n.67 and cases cited therein (1958).
76. E.g., Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Pioneer Mut. Comp. Co., 127 Colo. 516, 258
P.2d 776 (1953); Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Wolbarst, 95 N.H. 40, 57 A.2d 151
(1948).
77. Comment, supra note 75, at 367 n.68 and cases cited therein.
78. E.g., Farm Bur. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Martin, 97 N.H. 196, 84 A.2d 823 (1951).
79. New Jersey's statute does not define a motor vehicle liability policy, and sets
forth additional conditions which must be met before any policy would issue, N. J.
STAT. ANN. § 39:6-20 (1940); however, this provision has been repealed. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 39:6-23 (1961). The New Hampshire statute makes all policies absolute, re-
gardless of certification. N. H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 268:18 (1957). This statute will
be more fully discussed infra.
19681 1059
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
revision of the standard automobile liability policy declaring the
conformity clause applicable only when the policy "is certified as
proof."80 However, some recent courts, apparently relying to a sub-
stantial degree upon considerations of public policy, have held that
a conformity clause does read the statutory requirements into the
policy, at least with respect to omnibus coverage,81 notwithstanding
the fact that the policy was not certified as proof.82
3. Effect of Filing "Notice" upon Insurers' Liability.-A troublesome
issue which has arisen in recent years has concerned the effect upon
insurer's liability of filing "notice" of an effective policy in order to
satisfy the security requirement. In order to meet this requirement,
a great majority of drivers and owners carry liability insurance.
Under financial responsibility laws, a driver and owner of a vehicle
involved in an accident are required to file an accident report, and
upon demand for security, file a statement that either or both has
a liability policy within the statutory requirements. The designated
official then sends a notice to the insurer asking whether there is in
fact a policy in effect which covers the driver/owner with respect to
the accident. The insurer then has a certain period in which to file
notice (normally called an "SR-21") whether there is coverage or
to deny liability under the policy.
A typical factual situation can be described as follows: The
insured notifies the insurer (normally through his agent) of an acci-
dent and the insurer files an SR-21 acknowledging a valid policy in
effect. Subsequently the insurer ascertains that there is in fact no
coverage, since the driver came within an exclusion, or that there
is a valid policy defense; or, the insurer's investigation may have
disclosed no coverage, but in the meantime an employee or agent
of the insurer erroneously filed an SR-21 admitting coverage. Thus,
the question arises, what is the legal effect of such erroneous filing
upon the liability of the insurer. A good many courts have held that
filing of an SR-21 does not preclude an insurer from later raising a
defense or exclusion.83 However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
reached a contrary result in a series of cases commencing with Laugh-
80. See Risjord & Austin, supra note 74, at 83 n.2.
81. E.g., Jenkins v. Mayflower Ins. Exch., 93 Ariz. 287, 380 P.2d 145 (1963);
Wildman v. Government Employees' Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 31, 307 P.2d 359 (1957);
Howard v. American Service Mut. Ins. Co. 151 So. 2d 682 (Fla. App. 1963).
82. For an excellent discussion of the effect of the conformity clause, see Annot.,
8 A.L.R.3d 388 (1966).
83. E.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. West, 149 F. Supp. 289 (D. Md. 1957);
Hoosier Cas. Co. v. Fox, 102 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Iowa 1952); Strode v. Commercial
Cas. Ins. Co., 102 F. Supp. 240 (W.D. Ky. 1952). See also Risjord & Austin, stipra
note 74, at 90 n.29 and cases cited therein.
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nan v. Griffiths.4 These cases involved situations where the operator
of the vehicle was not covered; but through error on the part of the
insurer, an SR-21 was filed admitting coverage. In Laughnan the
court held that an insurer could make itself liable where, after investi-
gating the facts, it voluntarily filed an SR-21, intending to be bound
thereby, although without such filing it might not be bound.8 The
court reasoned that under the statute, the insurer had 60 days in
which to file, and this gave an adequate opportunity for a thorough
investigation. In Behringer v. State Farm Mutual,86 the court carried
the Laughnan holding even further in holding that an insurer was
conclusively bound by filing an SR-21 as to any act or facts existing at
time of filing which it then knew or could have known through the
exercise of due diligence.87 The Wisconsin court did not state any
specific legal theory upon which it was proceeding, and as a result,
writers speculated that these decisions may have been based upon
waiver,88 estoppel,89 or contract liability.90 However all of these sug-
gestions have been criticized,91 and the Prisuda court expressly denied
that it was proceeding upon any of these three theories.2 Without
actually stating public policy as the reason, the Wisconsin court
appeared to have been motivated by an attempt to extend the protec-
tion of the statute to certain plaintiffs who otherwise would not be
recompensed. The decisions could also be interpreted as a judicial
dislike for technical policy defenses and an effort by the court to
engraft as much of the absolute liability contained in the "certification
of proof" provisions as possible onto the "notice" provisions. Sub-
sequent to this line of decisions, and perhaps as a result, the Wisconsin
84. 271 Wis. 247, 73 N.W.2d 587 (1955); Prisuda v. General Cas. Co. of Amer.,
272 Wis. 41, 74 N.W.2d 777 (1956); 40 MARQ. L. REv. 241 (1957); Bebringer v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 275 Wis. 586, 82 N.W.2d 915 (1957); Prisuda v.
General Cas. Co. of Amer., 1 Wis.2d 166, 83 N.W.2d 739 (1957); Laughnan
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 1 Wis.2d 113, 83 N.W.2d 747 (1957); 106 U. PA. L. REv.
928 (1958); Challoner v. Pennings, 6 Wis. 2d 254, 94 N.W.2d 654 (1959).
85. 73 N.W.2d at 594. The court construed the SR-21 as an admission against
interest.
86. 82 N.W.2d 915 (1957).
87. Id. at 918.
88. 40 MA(2Q. L. REv. 241, 244 (1957).
89. Id.
90. Miller, SR-21, Notice or Contract, 24 INs. CouNs. J. 130 (1957).
91. The theory of estoppel is insufficient to create liability since there is no detri-
mental reliance by the injured party. Since the insurer didn't intentionally relinquish
known rights, Hoosier Gas. Go. v. Fox, 102 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Iowa 1952) would say
there is no waiver.




legislature revised the statute greatly mitigating the effect of these
cases.9
3
Laughnan v. Aetna Casualty raised another issue which could well
be the source of future litigation as to the extent of insurer liability.
In Laughnan, the actual policy limits were $10,000/$20,000, whereas
the statutory limits were $5,000/$10,000. The insurer argued that
even if the filing of the SR-21 was conclusive, such liability could not
exceed the statutory limits. Prior cases construing the effect of
absolute liability of insurers under certification provisions had held
that such liability was absolute only up to the statutory limits.
4
Laughnan held that the insurer was liable up to the limits of the
policy on the ground that the SR-21 brings the actual policy before
the court.95 While at first glance such a holding may seem unjust to
the insurer by heaping insult onto injury,96 it can be justified. By
barring certain policy defenses, the insured is, in effect, protected to
the same extent under the policy as though there were no policy
violations; since the parties bargained for coverage in excess of the
statutory limits, there is no reason why the insured should be denied
the full measure of the protection for which he has paid premiums.
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that insurers will accept such a result
without further litigation.
4. "Omnibus" Coverage.-Most automobile liability policies contain
an "omnibus" clause which provides that the term "insured" shall
include anyone driving the vehicle with the express or implied
permission of the "named insured." The courts have been quite
liberal in interpreting "permission" of the named insured, so as to
bring as many drivers as possible within the omnibus coverage. 7
Since omnibus coverage is required by most statutes in policies certi-
fied as proof, 8 the insurer is liable whether such coverage actually
93. For a discussion of the revised Wisconsin statute, see Miller, The Ncw SR-21
in Wisconsin, 25 INS. COUNSEL J. 342 (1958); Note, Insurance-The New Safety Re-
sponsibility Law, 1959 Wis. L. REv. 552.
94. E.g., Bebaney v. Travelers Ins. Co., 121 F.2d 838 (3d Cir. 1941); Farm Bur.
Auto Ins. Co. v. Martin, 97 N.H. 196, 84 A.2d 823 (1951).
95. 83 N.W.2d 747, 758.
96. Assuming that the policy limits were $100,000/$300,000, the insurer could cer-
tainly argue that the injured party is receiving a windfall, since without imposition of
liability by the court, the insurer would not be liable at all, because in effect, there is
no contract for coverage.
97. See, e.g., Teague v. Tate, 27 CCH AuTo. CAs. 2d 1037 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962)
(father gave son permission who in turn gave friend permission; held, second per-
mittee had implied consent of owner); Landis v. New Amsterdam Gas. Co., 347 Ill.
App. 560, 107 N.E.2d 187, 191 (1952). See also 6 U KAN. L. REv. 358, 369 n.84
(1958) and cases cited therein.
98. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1223(b)(2) (Supp. 1967).
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exists or not. Recent litigation has arisen concerning the effect of a
restrictive endorsement excluding omnibus coverage in policies not
certified as proof. The majority of courts have held that such coverage
is only required in certified policies.99 However, in Wildman v.
Government Employees Insurance Company,1 0 the California
Supreme Court held that such a restrictive endorsement excluding
coverage to permissive drivers other than the named insured violated
public policy and was therefore invalid. Thus, such coverage must
be considered a part of every liability policy, regardless of the actual
policy provisions. This decision incurred bitter comment on the part
of insurance writers' 01 as a judicial attempt to engraft certification
provisions onto voluntary policies which was tantamount to judicial
legislation.
Although the California legislature revised the statute so as to allow
such a restrictive endorsement as to non-certified policies,102 Wildman
has been followed in some five states.10 3 The most recent case to
follow Wildman was Jenkins v. Mayflower Insurance Exchange,
1' 4
where the insurer attempted to defend on the ground that a "motor
vehicle liability policy" was a term of art. 0 5 The court conceded that
a great majority of cases supported the insurer's argument, but
reasoned that to allow such a defense would defeat public policy and
the purposes of the statute.
5. New Hampshire Solution.-Although the efforts of some courts to
impose additional liability upon insurers has been strongly criti-
cized, such attempts are understandable in view of the strong public
policy in favor of compensation for victims. It makes little sense to
afford a greater degree of protection under the "proof" provisions
when it is in the "security" situation where the need for protection
99. See Evans, Financial Responsibility Laws Confusing to Jurists, 14 FED. INS.
COUNSEL Q. 66, 70 n.7 and cases cited therein (1964).
100. 48 Cal. 2d 31, 307 P.2d 359 (1957).
101. E.g., Evans, Voluntary or Certified, 8 FED. INS. COUNSEL Q. 80 (1958).
See also, Evans, supra note 99. It should be noted that a minority of jurisdictions
arrived at a similar result; however, this was due to particular statutory provisions.
See Evans, supra note 99, at 68.
102. CALF. Ins. CODE § 11580.1(e) (1963).
103. Howard v. American Service Mut. Ins. Co., 151 So. 2d 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1963); Standard Ace. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 178 A.2d 358 (N.J. Super. App. Div.
1962). See also, Saffore v. Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co., 21 N.J. 300, 121 A.2d 543 (1956);
10 OjmA. L. REv. 195 (1957) (same result prior to Wildman); Iszczukiewicz v. Uni-
versal Underwriters Ins. Co., 290 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1961) (interpreting Ohio law).
But see Moyer v. Aron, 175 Ohio St. 490, 196 N.E.2d 454 (1964); Protective Fire &
Cas. Co. v. Cornelius, 125 N.W.2d 179 (Neb. 1963).
104. 93 Ariz. 287, 380 P.2d 145 (1963) (endorsement excluding operator who was
member of armed forces).




is most acute. Nevertheless, the fact remains that nearly all statutes
do make a distinction, and so long as this is true, litigation will
continue.
New Hampshire has again taken the lead in providing a solution to
this problem. The New Hampshire statute provides that no motor
vehicle liability policy can be issued in the state, either before or
after the requirements of security and proof, unless it meets the re-
quirements for the policy as defined in the law.106 This has the effect
of making the minimum coverage of every policy uniform with the
insurer's liability, being the same under either requirement. It is
submitted that such a provision obviates most of the constructional
difficulties arising under the present laws and renders litigation such
as was involved in Wildman and the Wisconsin cases unnecessary.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
A. Criticisms of Existing Laws
The present financial responsibility laws have been strongly sup-
ported by the insurance industry'0 7 and have even "been hailed as the
solution to our problem" 108 by some writers, although many more
would disagree. One basic weakness of the existing laws is that they
are "remedial" rather than "preventive." As a result, every driver is
to a large extent still entitled to one free accident. As one writer
has observed:
Whether the insolvent motorist is deprived of his license upon his inability
to deposit security, or upon his inability to satisfy a final judgment is a
matter of little concern to the hapless victim who cannot recover in either
case.109
Serious defects still exist in the method of enforcement. The
initiative in reporting accidents and invoking the aid of the law is
still largely left with the injured party, and, although criminal
sanctions exist for failure to report, enforcement is another matter
where the injured party resigns himself to non-recovery or where both
drivers are uninsured.
106. N.H. REv. STAT. A 'N. §§ 268:15-18 (Supp. 1967).
107. Craugh, The Problem of the Financially Irresponsible Motorist, 1955 INs. L.J.
310; Wise, Financially Irresponsible Motorist and the Uncompensated Accident Victim,
1957 L-s. L.J. 139 (the greatest fear among the insurance industry is eventual govern-
mental owenership and operation of the insurance business).
108. Grad, Recent Developments in Automobile Accident Compensation, 50 COLum.
L. REv. 300, 309 (1950), referring not to his own views but to those expressed by
Wagner, Safety Responsibility Laws-A Review of Recent Developments, 9 GA. B.J.
160 (1946), and Johnson, The Modern Trend in Financial Responsibility Legislation,
1944 A.B.A. INs. SECTION 67.
109. Grad, supra note 108, at 311.
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The advocates of the laws point to the increased percentage of
insured drivers subsequent to passage of these laws, and argue that
the victims of the first accident are protected to a greater extent than
before. One writer estimated that in 1950, eight states had 90 per cent
or more insured vehicles, and in fourteen states, 80-89 per cent of the
vehicles were insured." 0 However, recent writers claim the more
accurate average to be about 83 per cent with a high of 87.8 per cent
in California."' Even- conceding the fact that the laws encourage
voluntary coverage, a substantial number of motorists are still unin-
sured,12 and the uninsured are usually financially irresponsible. As
one writer has observed, "very often .. .these uninsured cars will
be our most dangerous cars-old ones-driven by our most dangerous
drivers-young ones.
"113
Other serious weaknesses of existing laws are the inherent "gaps."
For example, the victim of the hit-and-run driver has no known
tortfeasor against whom he can invoke the law. Perhaps the more
predominant "gap" victims are those injured by an uninsured driver
of a stolen vehicle or a driver without the consent of the insured, as
well as those cases where the insurer disclaims liability or denies
coverage after loss.114
Perhaps the most basic weakness of such laws is that they encourage
or require only tort liability insurance, thereby leaving the victim of
an unavoidable accident uncompensated and other victims to the
"long and uncertain gauntlet of personal injury litigation.""15
B. Existing Attempts To Close the "Gaps" of Financial
Responsibility Laws
In an effort to close many of the inherent gaps of existing laws,
110. Marryott, Automobile Accidents and Financial Responsibility, 1953 INs. L. J.
758, 760 Table 1.
111. Ames, The Automobile Accident Commission Proposal, 14 U. FLA. L. REv. 398,
400 (1962). However, these figures do not reflect compulsory insurance states.
KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 6, at 65-66, estimate the national average of insured
drivers at 85%.
112. Assuming that 87.8% of the vehicles in California are insured, that still leaves
1,252,334 uninsured vehicles out of a total of over 10 million. Tennessee, which is
close to the national average with respect to the number of registered vehicles would
have approximtaely 300,000 uninsured vehicles and 400,000 uninsured drivers if 83%
of the total were insured.
113. KEETON & O'CoNNELL supra note 6, at 66, citing O'Connell, Taming the Auto-
mobile, 58 Nw. U.L. REV. 299, 336 (1963).
114. See Ward, The Uninsured Motorist: National and International Protecti n Pres-
ently Available and Comparative Problems in Substantial Similarity, 9 BUFF. L. REv.
283, 290 (1960).
115. KEETON & O'CoNNELL, supra note 6, at 109.
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various states have enacted supplementary legislation in an effort
to augment the existing protection.
1. Assigned Risk Plans.-26 states presently provide for assigned
risk plans whereby the state requires insurers to apportion among
themselves applicants for insurance policies who are in good faith
entitled, but unable, to procure insurance through ordinary
methods." 6 Although such plans have no effect upon those choosing
to drive without insurance, it does make insurance available to those
who desire it, such as elderly persons and younger drivers whom
insurers are normally hesitant to insure.
2. Uninsured Motorist Coverage.-At present, 23 states require that
insurers provide uninsured motorist coverage in policies issued within
the state. This coverage indemnifies a named insured and members
of his household against loss from inability to collect a valid claim
or judgment against an uninsured motorist for personal injury or
death (ordinarily not for property damage) resulting from a motor
vehicle accident.117 However, ironically some seventeen states allow
the insured to reject this coverage. There are also other criticisms
of this coverage: some versions of this coverage do not make it
clear whether hit-and-run victims are covered; also, the victim must
prove tort liability on the part of the uninsured motorist. One sig-
nificant improvement of such coverage is that ordinarily it provides
for arbitration of disputes between insurer and insured.
3. Unsatisfied Judgment Funds.-Perhaps the most significant at-
tempt to insure financial responsibility of the legally responsible
motorist has been the unsatisfied judgment fund. Four states-North
Dakota,118 New Jersey,119 Maryland, 20 and Michigan' 2l-presently
have such provisions. New York has a similar plan, which will be
116. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1238 (Supp. 1967). The constitutionality of such
plans was upheld in California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Maloney, 341
U.S. 105 (1951).
117. For excellent discussions of the mechanics and operation of such coverage, see
Donaldson, Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 34 INS. COUNSEL J. 57 (1967); 19 So. CMI.
L. REy. 269 (1967).
118. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 39-17-01 to -10 (Supp. 1967). For a discussion of the
North Dakota law, see Note, 5 S.D.L. REV. 108 (1960).
119. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6-61 to -91 (Supp. 1967). For a discussion of the New
Jersey law, see Bambrick, A Look At The New Jersey Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment
Fund, 1956 INS. L.J. 725.
120. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66 1/2 §§ 150-79 (Supp. 1967).
121. MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 9.2801-31 (Supp. 1968). For a discussion of the Michigan
law, see Note, Motor Vehicles-Legislation-The Michigan Motor Vehicle Accident
Claims Act, 65 MIcH. L. REV. 180 (1966).
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discussed subsequently. Basically these laws, with considerable varia-
tion in detail, provide for accumulation of a state fund, partly from
motor vehicle registration fees and the remainder from assessments
against insurers writing automobile liability policies in the state. A
person with an unsatisfied judgment from an automobile accident in
excess of a minimum amount, can apply to the court for an order
directing payment out of the fund up to the statutory limits (for
example $10,000/$20,000). These statutes also provide benefits to
victims of hit-and-run accidents. Nevertheless, such plans still leave
certain gaps and have been criticized. In the first place all are de-
pendent on proof of tort liability. Three' 22 exclude non-residents,
except where reciprocity exists with states that provide similar benefits,
and North Dakota excludes non-residents entirely. New Jersey ex-
cludes a judgment debtor's family and uninsured motorists and their
families.'23 Although the constitutionality of such laws has been
upheld,m the basic argument against such laws is that they are
unfair to the insured motorist who is forced to pay for part of the
fund used to compensate victims of uninsured motorists. This comes
about through hidden costs in their liability insurance premiums, part
of which are used by the insurer to pay the assessments imposed by
the state.
4. New York's MVAIC.-New York's solution as a supplement to
its compulsory insurance law was the creation of the Motor Vehicle
Accident Indemnification Corporation (MVAIC),'25 which is an im-
provement upon the unsatisfied judgment funds. This is a non-profit
corporation, whose directors are made up of insurance executives.
The fund is maintained solely by a charge on insurers writing auto-
mobile policies in New York. The law provides for compensation
to victims of accidents caused by either resident or non-resident
uninsured motorists, hit-and-run, stolen vehicles, vehicles operated
without the owner's permission, insured vehicles in cases where the
insurer successfully disclaims liability, and unregistered vehicles.
Although the MVAIC is an improvement over the unsatisfied
judgment fund, it is still subject to many of the same criticisms levied
at the funds: namely, exclusion of non-residents and unfairness to
122. New York, New Jersey and Maryland.
123. N. J. REv. STAT. § 39:6-70 (Supp. 1967).
124. E.g., Allied Amer. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 219
Md. 607, 150 A.2d 421 (1959).
125. For a thorough discussion of the MVAIC, see Note, The Problem of the
Financially Irresponsible Motorist-New York's MVAIC, 65 CoLUMr. L. REv. 1075
(1965); Ward, New Yorks Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation: Past,
Present and Future, 8 BrFF. L. RE.v. 215 (1959).
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insured motorists.126 Also, the procedural requirements have been
criticized.
127
C. Proposal for Reform
1. Compulsory Insurance or Proof.-As previously stated, one of
the inherent weaknesses of the existing financial responsibility laws
is that they are remedial rather than preventive. Thus, every motorist
is free to drive uninsured or without demonstrating any financial
responsibility until he is involved in an accident or convicted of a
serious traffic violation. The inadequacy of this theory is glaringly
apparent, and in essence such legislation is designed to do no more
than attempt to lock the barn after the horse is stolen. In an effort
to achieve a preventive element, the most logical step would be
enactment of compulsory insurance laws. However, due to the
persisting hostility of the insurance industry toward such laws, it is
doubtful that many states would enact such legislation in the immedi-
ate future.
It is submitted that virtually the same result could be achieved by
a simple amendment to existing statutes requiring a motorist to
demonstrate "proof' of financial responsibility prior to registering his
vehicle and/or securing his license. Thus, this would be a "compul-
sory proof law." A heavy penalty would be imposed for failure to
maintain proof at all times, and would apply to owners, drivers, and
non-residents. 128 In addition to the compulsory proof provision, the
statute could incorporate an assigned risk plan so as to provide
coverage to marginal or undesirable risks.
Of course, the logical question which arises at this point is why
would a compulsory proof law be any less objectionable to the
insurance industry than compulsory insurance laws. There are at
least two primary reasons why insurer opposition may not be as
great. First, such a law does the least violence to, and works the
least interference with, existing insurance practices and procedures,
as contrasted with other recent reform proposals. For this reason, a
form of compulsory proof legislation has been endorsed by at least
one insurance executive. 2 9 Thus, the threat of state takeover of the
insurance industry is not as apparent. The second, and most impor-
tant reason, is the increasing clamor for reform on the part of writers
126. For a general discussion of the criticisms, see KEEroN & O'CONNELL, supra noto
6, at 115-18.
127. Ward, supra note 125, at 236-39.
128. For a proposed "compulsory proof" provision and discussion, see Appendix A
infra, at I.
129. Craugh, supra note 107, at 317.
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and the public. Some key legislatures are giving serious attention to
the problem of compensation of accident victims. 130 Therefore, should
the insurance industry resign itself to the fact that some form of
reform is inevitable, it would be to its interest to support a less
drastic reform proposal, such as it did when it actively promoted the
original safety responsibility laws when faced with the threat of
compulsory insurance statutes.
It is submitted that adoption of a compulsory proof provision would
also eliminate a great deal of litigation involving the extent of insurer
liability. Such a provision would require that all policies be "certified
as proof," thereby eliminating the present dichotomy between insurer's
liability under the "proof" and "security" provisions, and providing a
wider range of protection. Also, such a provision should include a
requirement, such as that of New Hampshire, whereby every auto-
mobile liability policy sold within the state must meet the minimum
coverage requirements of the "motor vehicle liability policy" as defined
in the statute. This would foreclose many technical policy defenses
and restrictive endorsements.
131
Another improvement would be to incorporate the present require-
ment contained in "proof' provisions to the effect that an insurer
must notify the state prior to terminating or cancelling coverage.
This could also be extended to require notice prior to or immediately
after expiration of the policy or voluntary termination by the insured.
Thus, the state would be informed as to who is or is not insured at
any given time.'1  This of course would present no problem as to
those choosing to demonstrate proof by depositing cash, bond or
securities, since these items would be held by the state.
2. Reporting and Enforcement.-Another serious weakness of exist-
ing laws is that, to a great extent, they still rely upon the initiative
130. Changes Ahead For Auto Insurance?, U. S. NEws & Wol REP., Oct. 2, 1967,
at 49-50, states that the Keeton & O'Connell "Basic Protection Plan" is presently under
consideration in Massachusetts, Illinois, Michigan, and Minnesota, with comparable
plans under consideration in California and New York.
131. For a proposed statutory provision and discussion, see Appendix A infra, at II.
132. A problem could arise with respect to possible double coverage. Assume that
insurer A cancels the policy and sends notice to the state. In the meantime, the motorist
obtains a policy from insurer B, who files an SR-22. Prior to receipt of notice from
insurer A or the SR-22 from insurer B, the motorist has an accident, and the question
could then arise as to which of the insurers is liable or whether they both are. This
problem could be avoided by inserting a provision in the statute whereby: (1) insurer
B becomes primarily liable and insurer A secondarily liable, and in neither event will
their liability exceed the limits of the primary policy; or, (2) a provision similar to that
of the Tennessee statute, whereby the subsequent policy shall be deemed effective as
of the date of certification terminating the liability of prior insurers as of that date.
See TEN. CODE ANNe. § 59-1224 (Supp. 1967). For a proposed statutory solution see
Appendix A infra, at III.
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of the injured party to report in order to bring the statute into
effect. Although criminal penalties are available for failure to report,
enforcement may be another matter, and it is difficult to estimate
the number of unreported accidents.
In an effort to strengthen enforcement and reporting, Illinois has
a system which is less dependent upon the initiative of the victims.
The Illinois statute, like those of most states, requires all involved
drivers and owners to report; however, Illinois further requires the
investigating law enforcement officer to file a copy of his accident
report.13 In addition, the Department of Public Works subscribes to
a newspaper clipping service informing them of all fatal accidents.134
Such measures give the state an independent source of information
particularly valuable where both operators are uninsured. States
might also consider the feasibility of requiring hospitals, private
physicians, garages and auto repair facilities, and tow truck services
to make reports. 135
a. Impounding.-At present, California and New York are the only
states with provisions for impounding a vehicle in the event that an
owner fails to comply with the security provisions of the financial
responsibility law. 36 Under the statute, such vehicle is impounded
at the owner's expense until he has complied with the conditions set
forth in the statute. 37 This provision, in present form, still leaves
something to be desired, since it does not come into effect until after
the accident. It is submitted that states might investigate the feasibil-
ity of impounding under a compulsory proof provision whenever a
motorist cannot show proof of financial responsibility. 38  Thus, im-
pounding could often occur prior to an accident and would provide a
stimulus to procure insurance. If it achieved nothing else, it would
at least remove a number of uninsured vehicles from the highway.
b. Mandatory Inspection.-It has been estimated that approxi-
mately ten per cent of all traffic accidents are caused by vehicles in
unsafe mechanical condition.139 The 1966 National Vehicle Safety
Check, conducted by the National Safety Council, disclosed that lights,
133. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, § 138.02 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967). It should
be noted that this section does not apply to municipalities with over 500,000 inhabitants.
See Appendix A infra, at IV.
134. KEETON & O'CoNNELL, supra note 6, at 108 n.136.
135. For proposed statutory provisions and discussion, see Appendix A infra, at IV.
136. CALIF. VEMCLE CODE § 16102 (1960); N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW art.
6, § 318(12) (1960).
137. E.g., CALIF. VEHICLE CODE § 16105 (Supp. 1967).
138. For a proposed impounding provision and discussion, see Appendix A infra,
at V.
139. W. CunnAN & N. CaimzET, TnAtMA AND Tin AuToMoBmE 68 (1966).
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including stop lights, were defective on one-third of the vehicles
inspected. Other common defects, in order of importance, were: turn
signals, brakes, windshield wipers, tires, exhaust systems and steer-
ing.1
40
At present, 25 states, the District of Columbia, and 9 cities require
a periodic safety inspection of registered vehicles.'41 In addition,
numerous other states have enacted enabling legislation in an effort
to comply with the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
of 1966. 142 Mandatory vehicle inspection certainly has merit and
could also be used to implement the purposes of the financial
responsibility laws.
The statute would require a periodic inspection at which time the
motorist would also have to demonstrate proof of financial responsibil-
ity. Thus, the inspection would not only serve to detect unsafe
vehicles (which often are uninsured), but would also provide a
supplementary means of assuring proof. In addition, the statute
could provide for impounding in the event of failure to repair and
failure to demonstrate proof.143
3. Supplemental Remedies.-Regardless of the number and extent
of preventive provisions available, it is apparent that there will con-
tinue to be uninsured or judgment-proof motorists who somehow
manage to evade the requirements of the law. Also, there is the
problem of the hit-and-run driver, the driver of the stolen vehicle
or one used without permission, the unregistered vehicle or unlicensed
driver, and a financially irresponsible non-resident. Obviously the
security provisions will have to be retained. Also, it is submitted that
all states would do well to adopt the supplementary gap-closing
devices to insure a greater measure of protection.
Uninsured motorist coverage should be compulsory, covering the
insured and his family. Also such coverage should extend to: hit-and-
run, unregistered vehicles, unlicensed drivers, stolen cars or non-
permissive users, and insured vehicles where the insurer successfully
disclaims liability.44 This could take a great deal of pressure off the
MVAIC fund and leave that remedy available to non-driving victims
140. NATIONAL SAFrv CoUNcIL, AccIDENT FAcTs 57 (1967).
141. E.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 7A (Supp. 1967) (requiring annual inspec-
tion); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 64-21-4 (1960) (requiring inspection at least twice per
year but no more than three times per year); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 46.32.010
(Supp. 1967) (requiring inspection at such periodic intervals as deemed necessary at
the discretion of the chief of the state patrol).
142. 15 U.S.C. § 1381 (Supp. II, 1965-66).
143. For a proposed statutory provision, see Appendix A infra, at VI.
144. For a proposed statutory provision, see Appendix A infra, at VII.
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or others who have no uninsured motorist coverage, such as motorists
who deposit cash, securities, or secure a bond.
The MVAIC plan has great merit and is worth considering by
states. Moreover, if all states had such a plan, reciprocity would be
no problem, and the benefits would be available to non-resident
victims. A problem will occur with respect to the uninsured victim
who has also failed to demonstrate proof in accordance with the
statute, and in this regard the states will have to balance the concepts
of fairness with that of assuring maximum compensation to as many
victims as possible.
4. Uniformity.-Although the majority of statutes were patterned
after the earlier uniform "Safety Responsibility Law," considerable
diversity still exists between states with respect to application and
enforcement. The uniform law was revised in 1962145 and reflects
the new emphasis on security provisions; however, it is still somewhat
conservative in its approach.
The area of financial responsibility of motorists is a desirable
subject for uniform legislation, particularly in light of the widespread
interstate travel prevalent today. It is possible that such uniformity
may come in the form of a federal statute. The automobile insurance
industry has recently come under strong criticism from state insurance
commissions and policy holders with respect to underwriting prac-
tices and rates.146 This has led to congressional investigation, which in
turn could lead to federal regulation. 47 This of course would provide
a measure of uniformity in insurance, and when one considers this
in conjunction with the minimum standards of the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act,148 it would seem but a relatively short,
and perhaps logical, step for the federal government to require a
measure of uniformity with respect to the financial responsibility
of motorists.
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, it is readily apparent that the existing problems which
arise under financial responsibility laws adequately demonstrate the
need for reform. The existing statutes have too many inherent gaps,
and even the supplementary gap-closing measures are no panacea. It
is also apparent that if the policy of the state is, or should be, to
assure compensation to all traffic victims, such a result can never
145. UNn oM VEHICLE CODE, ch. 7 (1962 version).
146. Essay, TnE, Jan. 26, 1968, at 20-21; U.S. Nmvs & WoRLD REP., supra note 130.
147. U.S. Nmvs & Wo.LD REPORT, supra note 130.
148. 15 U.S.C. § 1381 (Supp. II, 1965-66).
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be realized through financial responsibility laws. Regardless of how
sophisticated and complete such laws become, and, even if it were
possible to assure that all motorists would be financially responsible,
many victims would still remain uncompensated due to the fact that
all of these statutes must function within the existing framework of
negligence law, complete with the fault concept. The fault concept
has proven itself inadequate to deal with the increasing problem of
the uncompensated victim. Its doctrines are often too rigid, too
objective and therefore unadaptable to the needs and complexities
of a motoring society. The burdens of proof are often onerous,
requiring the injured plaintiff to clear the often insurmountable
hurdle of the defense of contributory negligence. Moreover, the fault
concept has led to serious court congestion, thereby compelling many
deserving victims to settle for considerably less than that to which
they are entitled as a price for avoiding the long and uncertain process
of personal injury litigation. Although the evils of the fault concept
are many, its advocates have successfully repelled critics for over
40 years, and adoption of any proposal eliminating the fault concept
appears unlikely in the immediate future.
Thus, the fault concept stands as a primary obstacle to an effective
system which would guarantee at least a measure of compensation to
all traffic victims. Moreover, the fault concept is perpetuated by the
financial responsibility law, which even as early as the 1920's was
considered a compromise proposal. Nevertheless, such statutes and
their supplementary devices are all that are available at present;
and to the extent that criticisms of existing measures have merit,






A. Proof of Financial Responsibility Required.
No motor vehicle shall be registered in this state nor:shall any operator's
license be issued unless (optional clause #1-the owner of such vehicle or
applicant for such license certifies that the applicant can demonstrate proof
of financial responsibility in the amounts and in accordance with the re-
quirements of this chapter)
1968 ] LEGISLATION 1073
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
(optional clause #2-the application for such registration or operator's
license is accompanied by proof of financial responsibility of the applicant
in accordance with the requirements of this chapter).
The owner of a motor vehicle and any operator shall maintain proof of
financial responsibility continuously throughout the period of registration
for each vehicle and throughout the period such operator's license is in
effect. Failure to maintain proof of financial responsibility in accordance
with the requirements of this chapter shall constitute a misdemeanor.
Comment:
In the opinion of this writer, optional clause number two is pref-
erable. Such a provision compels the motorist to demonstrate pre-
cisely how he intends to show proof. However, this provision is es-
sentially a compulsory insurance requirement, and for that reason
would undoubtedly incur strong opposition from the insurance in-
dustry and legislators who abhor compulsory insurance in any form.
Optional clause number one should certainly encourage the pur-
chase of insurance. One question which may arise concerns certifica-
tion by a motorist who intends to demonstrate proof by the deposit
of cash or securities. It would appear that such a motorist will prob-
ably have to deposit in advance for at least two reasons: (1) it is
doubtful that the state would merely accept his word without some
proof of his ability to respond in this manner; and (2) absent a deposit
receipt or some form of acknowledgment, the motorist has no way of
demonstrating his compliance with the proof requirement when his
vehicle is inspected or upon request of an officer.
Perhaps the main reason why insurers object to a provision requir-
ing filing of insurance certificates with the state is that they consider
it an administrative nuisance. To some extent insurers have a valid
objection when viewed in light of the Massachusetts provision re-
quiring policies issued in the state to be contiguous with the registra-
tion period. Such a requirement could place a tremendous adminis-
trative burden upon insurers in the event numerous states should
adopt a similar provision.
There appears to be no valid reason for requiring that policies be
contiguous with the registration period or that insurers must file a
certification each year during the registration period. Once a policy
has been certified, it is notice of cancellation or termination which
the state is most interested in, and where an insured continuously
maintains the same policy in effect or if the policy term is for a
period in excess of a year, it seems senseless to require annual certifi-
cation by the insurer.
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B. Penalty for owning and operating a motor vehicle knowing that
proof has not been provided
Any owner of a motor vehicle registered in this state, or of an un-
registered vehicle, who shall operate such motor vehicle or permit it to
be operated in this state without having demonstrated and maintained
proof of financial responsibility in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter, and any other person who shall operate in this state any motor
vehicle registered in this state, or an unregistered vehicle, with the knowl-
edge that the owner thereof has not maintained proof of financial responsi-
bility shall be punished by a fine of not less than $500.00 nor more than
$1,000.00, or by imprisonment for not more than one year or both; pro-
vided however, that the provisions of this section shall not apply to an
operator who at the time of operation of such motor vehicle has demon-
strated and maintained proof of financial responsibility in accordance with
the provisions of this chapter.
Comment:
This provision is, of course, in addition to those prescribing re-
vocation or suspension of registrations and licenses, and impounding.
A clause making the requirements of the statute applicable to non-
residents is not included, since most existing statutes adequately de-
fine applicability to nonresidents. For example, see the Uniform
Vehicle Code, §§ 7-206, 213, 307 and 322.
C. Definitions
The term "proof of financial responsibility" shall mean proof of ability
to respond in damages for liability arising out of the ownership, mainte-
nance, or use of a motor vehicle.
Proof of financial responsibility may be demonstrated by any of the
following methods:
(a) A certificate of insurance which meets the requirements of a "motor
vehicle liability policy" as defined in sections___
(b) A bond as provided in sections__ ;
(c) A deposit in cash or securities with the department in the amount
of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000.00);
(d) Qualification as a self-insurer as provided in sections
Comment:
Most existing statutes adequately define the requirements of a bond




No motor vehicle liability policy shall be issued or delivered in this
state unless such policy meets the minimum requirements of the "motor
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vehicle liability policy" as defined in sections__ and is certified as proof
in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
1. Required Provisions
A motor vehicle liability policy shall be subject, with respect to acci-
dents which occur in this state (optional clause-and within limits of
liability required by this chapter), to the following provisions which
need not be contained therein:
(examples)
(a) Liability of Insurer "absolute", etc.
(b) The insurance applies to any person who has obtained possession
or control of the motor vehicle of the insured with his express or im-
plied consent even though the use in the course of which liability to
pay damages arises has been expressly or impliedly forbidden by the
insured or is otherwise unauthorized. This provision, however, shall
not apply to the use of a motor vehicle converted with the intent
wrongfully to deprive the owner of his property therein.
(note: clause (b) is N.H. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 268:16(iv) (1955).
Comment:
Most existing statutes adequately define a "motor vehicle liability
policy" certified as proof. A provision setting forth required provisions
is strongly recommended in an effort to prevent needless litigation
concerning the extent of insurer liability, certain policy defenses, and
restrictive endorsements relating to omnibus coverage and other
matters.
There may be disagreement concerning the advisability of limiting
insurer liability under the required provisions to the limits of the
statute, particularly where the actual policy limits are in excess of
the $10,000/$20,000 limit. Certainly the insurers would prefer, for
example, that the provision making them absolutely liable, thereby
precluding many of their policy defenses, be limited to the statutory
amounts. However, jurisdictions such as Wisconsin have determined
that the liability extends to the actual policy limits. Since there is a
conflict of policy, this language is optional.
III.
A. Notice of Cancellation or Termination of a Motor Vehicle Li-
ability Policy
When an insurance carrier has certified a motor vehicle liability policy
in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, such a policy shall not be
canceled or terminated until at least ten days after notice of such cancel-
lation or termination shall be filed with the department; provided how-
ever,
(optional clause #1-if another certified insurance policy has been pro-
cured prior to the expiration of ten days after notice of cancellation or
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termination has been filed, then such subsequently procured policy shall
be considered as the primary insurance in effect and the cancelled or
terminated policy shall be considered secondary insurance until expiration
of such ten day period. In no event shall the liability of the primary and
secondary insurance, whether joint or several, exceed the limits of the
primary insurance.)
(optional clause #2-if another insurance policy has been subsequently
procured and certified, such other insurance policy shall, as of the ef-
fective date of its certification, terminate the insurance previously certified
with respect to any motor vehicles or named insured designated in both
policies.)
Comment:
In the opinion of this writer, optional clause number two is
preferable for the simple reason that it more accurately reflects
the intent of the parties. In no event should the combined liability
of insurers A and B exceed the limits of the primary policy, since
this would result in a windfall to the injured party.
IV.
A. Duty to report accident
1. Police to report
Every law enforcement officer (except those employed by munici-
palities having a population of 500,000 or more) who investigates a
motor vehicle accident resulting in injury or death of any person, or in
which damage to the property of any one person exceeds $100.00, or
who prepares a written report as a result of an investigation either at
the time and scene of such accident or thereafter by interviewing
participants or witnesses shall forward a written report of such accident
to the department within ten days after investigation of the accident,
or within such other time as is prescribed by the department.
Comment:
As stated in footnote 133, supra, the Illinois statute does not require
reports from municipalities with populations in excess of 500,000. This
exception was probably prompted by administrative considerations,
but it seems ironic that reports are not required from cities which
often have the largest number of accidents and a higher annual acci-
dent rate. It would appear that the argument of administrative feasi-
bility is greatly mitigated by the increased availability and use of
computers as well as an efficient system of short form reporting.
2. Optional Clauses
Hospitals and Physicians to report
(a) Any hospital or clinic, whether public or private, which renders
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medical treatment to any person for injuries sustained as a result of a
motor vehicle accident shall forward a written report of such treatment
to the department on forms as provided or approved within ten days
after such date as the injured person is initially admitted for treatment.
(b) The reporting requirements of this section shall apply to all
physicians who render medical attention to any injured person at a
location other than a hospital or clinic; provided however, that such
report will not be required where such medical treatment is adminis-
tered subsequent to the release of such injured person from a hospital
or clinic; or, where such injured person is admitted to a hospital or
clinic for treatment immediately after such medical attention is initially
rendered.
(c) The reporting requirements of this section shall apply to ambu-
lance attendants, other than physicians, who administer medical at,
tention or first aid to an injured person, unless immediately thereafter
such injured person is transported to a hospital or clinic, or to a
physician for treatment.
Coroners to report
Every coroner in this state shall, on or before the tenth day of each
month, forward a written report to the department of the death of any
person as the result of a motor vehicle accident within his jurisdiction
during the preceding calendar month. Such report shall set forth the
time, date, and location of the accident and the circumstances relating
thereto.
Automobile repair facilities and tow services to report
(a) Any automobile repair facility in the state (including service
stations and automobile wrecking services) which repairs a motor
vehicle damaged as the result of a motor vehicle accident and where
the amount of such damage exceeds $100.00 shall forward a written
report of this fact to the department on forms as provided or approved
within ten days after the date such repairs are commenced.
(b) The reporting requirements of this section shall also apply to
all tow services where the motor vehicle is damaged as the result of a
motor vehicle accident. In addition, the tow service shall report the
time, date, and location of the accident and the location where such
damaged vehicle is delivered.
Comment:
No doubt the main argument which will be directed toward requir-
ing hospitals, physicians, and coroners to report is that of adminis-
trative feasibility; however, they are already required to keep such
records. Also, use of a short form reporting procedure would lessen
the burden.
Reports from medical sources and automobile repair facilities would
be desirable for two reasons: (1) they would provide a supple-
mentary source of information with regard to accidents which are
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reported and because (2) they would bring to light accidents which
are at the present time never investigated by law enforcement
officers.
V.
A. Impounding and storage of vehicle
Whenever the registration of any motor vehicle is suspended or re-
voked pursuant to the provisions of (i.e., provisions regarding
failure to demonstrate proof, inspection, failure to deposit security etc.,)
(optional clause #1-the owner of the motor vehicle shall immediately cause
the vehicle to be stored at the expense of the owner, in such private or
public garage or storage place or places in this state as the owner may
select)
(optional clause #2-the department shall order such vehicle impounded
and placed in storage at the expense of the owner in such storage place as
designated by the department).
Such storage shall continue for such period of time as is provided in
this chapter.
B. Duration of storage
The storage of such motor vehicle shall continue until the owner has
complied with the provisions of - (i.e., provisions regarding proof,
inspection, security etc.)
Comment:
Of the two optional clauses under A, number two would appear to
be preferable, since it gives the department more control. On the
other hand, administrative considerations may favor acceptance of
clause number one.
VI.
A. Periodic inspection of all motor vehicles
The department shall require that every motor vehicle registered in this
state be inspected twice each year in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter.
At the time each motor vehicle is inspected, the owner of such vehicle
shall be required to demonstrate proof of financial responsibility in ac-
cordance with the provisions of (compulsory proof provisions).
B. Enforcement
The department shall suspend the registration of any motor vehicle for
which a certificate of inspection has not been obtained as required by this
chapter or which is not repaired within the period designated in sec-
tion . In addition to suspension of registration, failure to comply
with the provisions of this article shall result in impounding and storage




A. Uninsured motor vehicle coverage
No policy of liability insurance covering liability arising out of the
ownership, maintenance or use of any motor vehicle shall be issued or
delivered in this state to the owner or operator of a motor vehicle unless
such policy contains, or has added to it by endorsement, a provision with
coverage limits at least equal to the financial responsibility requirements
of this chapter insuring the insured named therein and to the same extent
any other person using, or legally responsible for the use of said motor
vehicles with the permission of the named insured, express or implied, for
all sums within such limits which said insured person shall be legally en-
titled to recover as damages for bodily injury or wrongful death from the
owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle.
B. Definitions:
(a) the term "insured" means the named insured and the spouse of
the named insured and relatives of either while residents of the same
household.
(b) the term "uninsured motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle with
respect to the ownership, maintenance or use of which there is no bodily
injury liability insurance or bond applicable at the time of the accident,
or where the owner or operator of such uninsured vehicle fails to demon-
strate proof of financial responsibility in accordance with the requirements
of this chapter. In addition, the term "uninsured motor vehicle" shall
include: a motor vehicle used without the permission of the owner thereof;
stolen motor vehicles; unregistered motor vehicles; unlicensed operators;
unidentified motor vehicles which leave the scene of the accident; uninsured
motor vehicles registered in a state other than this state; insured motor
vehicles where the insurer disclaims liability or denies coverage; and, an
insured motor vehicle where the liability insurer thereof is unable to make
payment with respect to the legal liability of its insured within the limits
specified therein because of insolvency.
Comment:
The provisions set forth above comprise only the more basic re-
quired provisions, and it is recommended that a detailed statute, such
as CALiF. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (West Supp. 1967), be consulted as
to additional provisions.
There may be criticism concerning extension of coverage where
the insurer of an alleged torifeasor disclaims liability or denies cov-
erage. It could be argued that such a provision may encourage some
insurers to disclaim liability in hopes that the insurer of the injured
party would therefore be required to make payment. The importance
of this argument is greatly mitigated by the statutory provisions re-
quiring all policies to be certified as proof and further subjecting all
policies to certain provisions as a matter of law. These requirements
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severely limit exclusions and traditional policy defenses, thereby mak-
ing it far more difficult for an insurer to successfully disclaim liability
or deny coverage. Also, in the event that an insurer can successfully
disclaim liability on the ground of fraudulent procurement, for ex-
ample, then it certainly does not seem unreasonable to consider the
alleged tortfeasor as uninsured.
There is another reason why coverage should be extended in such
a situation; namely, to avoid unnecessary circuity of action. It would
not appear inaccurate to say that in the event the majority of motorists
lost their liability coverage, they could be considered judgment-proof
with respect to an amount equal to or in excess of $5,000. Thus, it
would certainly appear, in many instances, to be an unnecessary and
unjustified waste of time and expense to require the injured party to
go through the formalities of securing an unsatisfied judgment only
to turn to his insurer for payment. Also, should a jurisdiction adopt
a MVAIC fund, the injured party would be compelled to submit his
claim against the MVAIC, and, since it is funded by the insurance
industry, it eventually pays anyway.
APPENDIX B
ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 74 (Supp. 1965); ALasxA STAT. 88 28.20.010 to -.640
(1959); Amz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1101 to -1225 (Supp. 1967); ARKx. STAT.
ANN. § 75-1401 to -1493 (Supp. 1967); CALIF. VEH. CODE § 16000-503 (Supp.
1967); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-7-1 to -7-39 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT.
REV. §§ 14-108 to -142 (1965); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21 § 2901-72 (Supp. 1966);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-417 to -498 (1960); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 324.001-271
(Supp. 1966); GA. CODE ANN. § 92A-601 to -621 (Supp. 1967); IHwAn REv.
LAWs §§ 160-80 to -126 (1965); IDAHo CODE ANN. §§ 49-1501 to -1539 (Supp.
1965); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95Y § 7 (Supp. 1967); IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-1047
to -1084 (1957); IOWA CODE ANN. oh. 321A (1965); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 8-722-769 (Supp. 1967); Ky. REv. STAT. 88 187-290-.990 (Supp. 1967);
LA. REV. STAT. § 32:851-:1043 (Supp. 1967); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 29 §§
781-87 (1961); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66 , § 116-49 (Supp. 1967); MAss. ANN.
LAWS ch. 90, § 3G (1945); MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 9.2201-.2232 (Supp. 1968);
MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 170.01-.58 (Supp. 1967); Miss. CODE ANN. § 8285 (Supp.
1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 303.010-.370 (Supp. 1967); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§§ 53-418 to -458 (Sup. 1967); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 60-501 to -569 (1959);
NEV. REV. STAT. 88 485.010-.420 (1961); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 268 (Supp.
1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6 (Supp. 1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. 8§ 64-24-1 to-
24-104 (Supp. 1967); N.Y. VEMCLE & TRAFFIC LAW 88 330-368 (Supp. 1967);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279 (Supp. 1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-16 (Supp.
1967); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4509 (Baldwin 1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
47, § 7 (Supp. 1967); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 486.010-.991 (1955); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 75, §§ 1401-36 (Supp. 1967); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 31-31-1 to -22 (Supp.
1967); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 46-701 to -750 (Supp. 1967); S.D. CODE § 44.03A
(Supp. 1960); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 59-1201 to -1240 (Supp. 1967); TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. art. 6701h (Supp. 1967); UTAH CODE ANN. 88 41-12-1 to -12-41
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(Supp. 1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 801-09 (1965); VA. CODE ANN. §§
46.1-388 to -514 (1958); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 46.29.010 to -920 (Supp.
1967); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17D (1963); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 344.01-.52 (Supp.
1967); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-277 to -315 (1957).
